The Uncertain Path of the ‘New Turkey’

At the end of a year marked by turbulences both on the domestic and the regional levels and on the eve of crucial parliamentary elections, Turkey’s ‘success story’ seems to have waned, at least for a while, and its ‘golden years’ look now like a distant memory.

For a decade, Turkey was hailed as an advancing democracy, an emerging economy with impressive growing rates and an assertive regional power. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won three consecutive general elections in 2002, 2007 and 2011 gaining overwhelming majorities, has played a key role in this success story. The ‘AKP era’ has witnessed profound transformations in Turkish politics, society and economy. A conservative party promoting religious values and market-oriented policies, the AKP led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the most charismatic Turkish leader since Mustafa Kemal, transformed Turkey’s into a stable political system and a dynamic market which attracted huge international investments as never before. Today Turkey is a more dynamic and developed country than at the beginning of 2000s. Having tripled its GDP from $230 billion in 2002 to $820 billion in 2013, the country is the 17^thworld economy, with the ambition to become the 10^th by 2023. Although deep disparities remain, Turkey has witnessed a widespread improvement of its living conditions, access to welfare and infrastructures. Furthermore, the AKP has permitted the emergence in the public sphere – for decades dominated by Kemalist ideology – of major segments of provincial and conservative Turkish society that abide by traditional religious values.

At the regional level, Turkey has become one of the most influential players in the Middle East. Foreign policy dynamism coupled with an export-oriented economic model, access to a wide range of new markets and the diversification of partners allowed Turkey to significantly improve its international standing. The AKP can also take credit for bringing the country closer to the goal of European Union (EU) accession, starting negotiations at the end of 2005.

However, this bright picture does not entirely fit the current situation. After 2007 the reform process began to lose momentum as the ruling party started focusing more on strengthening its power, countering what it defined the ‘deep state’ and sidelining domestic opponents. At the same time, difficulties in the accession negotiations with the EU emerged, and the European anchor for democratic reforms lost its leverage and the population’s support for EU membership declined. Polarization started to increasingly characterize Turkish politics and society, and domestic dissent amplified after the 2011 general election when the AKP consolidated its ‘majority rule’ regime, neglecting and disregarding any form of dissent.

In the last eighteen months, the Gezi Park protests, the heavy-handed tactics used to quell them, the corruption scandal – followed by restrictions of the press freedom and the deterioration of the institutional system of checks and balances – have eroded the democratic process that Turkey had been enjoying, while showing the fragilities and the inner divisions of what had been acclaimed as the ‘Turkish model’.

ISPI report aims at analysing the main features and changes Turkey witnessed in the ‘AKP era’, as well as the reasons underlying the reversing path the country has been walking through both at domestic and regional levels in the last few years. The aim is to understand if this means the conclusion of the successful cycle or a turning point towards a new, but uncertain, era. It is worth noting that, following his election to the presidency of the Turkish Republic in August 2014, Erdoğan expressed his intention to build a ‘New Turkey’, emphasizing five points: advancing the democratic process; modifying the Constitution; solving the Kurdish issue; improving welfare and moving forwards on the EU accession negotiations. However, looking at recent developments many questions have been raised about where the ‘New Turkey’ is heading.

This interactive webdoc offers a preview of the ISPI Report The uncertain path of the "New Turkey", edited by Valeria Talbot, ISPI senior Research fellow.

The texts and data featured in this presentation are based on the researches conducted by the authors of the Report:

Meliha Benli Altunışık, Professor of International Relations and currently the Dean of the Graduate School of Social Sciences at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

Dimitar Bechev, D.Phil (Oxon), Visiting Fellow at the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science

Mustafa Kutlay, Research Fellow at the International Strategic Research Organization, Ankara, Turkey

Murat Somer, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations at Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey

Valeria Talbot, Senior Research Fellow and head of the Mediterranean and Middle East Programme, ISPI

The travails of Turkish domestic politics (Clone)

"Turkey is going through a complex and challenging phase in its political development. The hegemony established by the AKP and Erdoğan’s charismatic leadership have contributed a great deal to stability, delivering stable government and sound economic policies conducive to growth. That explains the unyielding support helping the party to fend off successive challenges, both from within the broad Islamist movement and the secularist spectrum. Equally, the extended stay in government has led to forms of symbiosis with or even capture of the state which, in the absence of a well functioning system of checks and balances, has pushed Turkish politics into an illiberal direction." Dimitar Bechev

Turkey's turn: the evolution of Turkey's political landscape since the creation of AKP

14 August 2001: Creation of AKP The AKP Party was established by a wide range of politicians of various political parties and a number of new politicians. The core of the party was formed from the reformist faction of the Islamist Virtue Party, including people such as Abdullah Gül, Bülent Arinç and Melih Gökçek. Among the other founders, there were members of the social conservative Motherland Party as well as members of the Turkish Democratic Party. Representatives of the nascent “Muslim left” were largely excluded. Since its birth, the AKP has refused the labels of “Islamic”, “Islamist” or “Islamic-oriented”; instead, it defines itself as a “conservative democratic party”.

3 November 2002: General elections The AKP won a sweeping victory in the 2002 elections, which saw every party previously represented in the Grand National Assembly ejected from the chamber. It won a two-thirds majority of seats, becoming the first Turkish party in 11 years to win an outright majority. Erdoğan normally would have become Prime Minister, but was banned from holding any political office after a 1994 incident in which he read a poem deemed pro-Islamist by judges. As a result, Gül became Prime Minister.

14 March 2003: The beginning of the Erdoğan era In 2003, Erdoğan’s ban was abolished with the help of the Republican People’s Party and Erdoğan became Prime Minister by being selected to parliament after a by-election in Siirt.

28 March 2004: Local elections In the local elections of 2004, the AKP won 42% of the votes, making inroads against the secular Republican People’s Party (CHP) on the South and West Coast, and against the Social Democratic People’s Party, which is supported by some Kurds in the South-East of Turkey.

22 July 2007: General and presidential elections On April 14, 2007, an estimated 300,000 people marched in Ankara to protest the possible candidacy of Erdoğan in the 2007 presidential election, afraid that if elected as President, he would alter the secular nature of the Turkish state. Erdoğan announced on April 24, 2007 that the party had decided to nominate Abdullah Gül as the AKP candidate in the presidential election. The protests continued over the next several weeks. Early parliamentary elections were called after the failure of the parties in parliament to agree on the next Turkish President. The opposition parties boycotted the parliamentary vote and deadlocked the election process. At the same time, Erdoğan claimed the failure to elect a President was a failure of the Turkish political system and proposed to modify the constitution. The AKP achieved victory in the rescheduled July 22, 2007 elections with 46.6% of the vote, translating into control of 341 of the 550 available parliamentary seats. Abdullah Gül was elected President in late August with 339 votes in the third round.

21 October 2007: Constitutional referendum After the opposition parties deadlocked the 2007 presidential election by boycotting the parliament, the ruling AKP proposed a constitutional reform package. The reform package was first vetoed by President Sezer, who then applied to the Turkish constitutional court about it, because the President is unable to veto amendments for the second time. The court did not find any problems in the package and 69% of the voters supported the constitutional changes. The reforms consisted of: electing the President by popular vote instead of by parliament; reducing the presidential term from seven years to five; allowing the President to stand for re-election for a second term; holding general elections every four years instead of five; reducing the quorum of lawmakers needed for parliamentary decisions from 367 to 184.

18 March 2008: AKP risks closure The Constitutional court of Turkey heard a case in favour of closing down the AKP and banning 71 senior members from politics for five years. Although the AKP survived closure, it lost 50% of its state funding.

29 March 2009: Local elections After the success of the AKP in the 2007 general elections, the party saw a decline in the local elections of 2009. In these elections the AKP received 39% of the vote, 3% less than in the local elections of 2004. Still, the AKP remained the dominating party in Turkey.

12 September 2010: Constitutional referendum A referendum on reforming the Constitution was agreed by a majority of 58%. The reform package included: the right of individuals to appeal to the highest court, the creation of the ombudsman’s office, the possibility to negotiate a nation-wide labor contract, positive exceptions for female citizens, the ability of civilian courts to convict members of the military, the right of civil servants to go on strike, a privacy law, and the structure of the Constitutional court.

12 June 2011: General elections In accordance to the result of the Constitutional referendum held in 2007, the election was held four years after the previous one instead of five. The AKP gained a third consecutive victory, and its leader Erdoğan was re-elected as Prime Minister.

May-August 2013: Gezi Park protests What started as an environmental protest aimed at saving Istanbul’ s Gezi park from shopping centre developers backed by the government, appeared to be snowballing into a national display of anger at the perceived high-handedness of the Erdogan government. Police staged consecutive raids on protesters, using tear gas and water cannon, but the protests grew in scale, with artists, intellectuals and opposition MPs joining the ranks.

29 October 2013: Opening of the Marmaray tunnel, connecting Europe and Asia Erdoğan opened the Marmaray tunnel, the world's deepest underwater railway.

December 2013: Corruption scandal In December 2013, a corruption scandal concerning the alleged award of illegal permits in building projects broke out. Among the suspects, there were businessmen close to Erdoğan and the sons of three top ministers. Erdogan has cast the corruption investigations as part of an attempted "judicial coup" by U.S.-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen, a former ally who wields influence in the police and judiciary. Erdoğan used some of his strongest language yet to denounce his former allies in the Gulen movement and promised to dismiss them. “We will root out the bad apples or whatever is necessary,” he said. As a consequence, dozens of high-level police officials and hundreds of other officers have been removed. Reports emerged in the Turkish news media in the days following the revelation of the investigation that prosecutors were pursuing other high-level officials, but that new police officials installed by the government had resisted pursuing them. This essentially highlighted a power struggle within state structures. Recordings appear to capture Erdoğan ordering his son to get rid of millions of dollars in incriminating cash, following the corruption investigation. Erdoğan dismissed the allegations against him as a plot to bring down his government.

21 March 2014: Turkey blocks use of social media Following the appearance of wiretapped recordings purportedly showing evidence of corruption among Erdoğan’s inner circle, Turkey restricts access to Twitter, saying that the action is taken as a “protection measure”. EU officials, human rights organisations, the US government and the UN all expressed grave concern about Turkey's attempt to curb freedom of expression. The ban is then lifted after a local court issued a stay of execution.

30 March 2014: Local elections AKP gained a substantial victory in nationwide local elections, seen as a barometer of Erdoğan’s popularity. Speaking at a victory rally in Ankara, the Prime minister said it was time for a “new Turkey”, adding that “Seventy-seven million should know that the new Turkey has won today. Today is a day of victory”.

15 May 2014: Turkish PM's aide kicks mine disaster protester Yusef Yerkel, an aide to the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was photographed while kicking a protester during a visit to the town of Soma, the scene of the country’s worst ever mining disaster. The photo went viral on social media.

10 July 2014: Turkey approves law allowing peace talks with PKK Turkish President Abdullah Gul has approved a law to allow peace talks with Kurdish rebels, in an important step towards ending a three-decade conflict.

10 August 2014: Erdoğan elected as President Barred by party rules to seek a fourth term as Prime Minister, Erdoğan wins the country’s first direct presidential election. The Turkish head of state was previously chosen by parliament but a 2010 referendum gave Turks the possibility to choose their President by a direct vote. The post has always been largely ceremonial, but Erdoğan announced that he wished to increase the presidential powers. Ahmet Davutoglu, former Foreign Minister and Erdoğan’s close ally, is appointed Prime Minister. Paying visit at the mausoleum of the nation’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Erdoğan writes in the visitors’ book: “Today, the day the first President elected by the people takes office, is the day Turkey is born from his aches”.

01 September 2014: New wave of raids against police officers In the fourth wave of raids since July, as the government cracks down on what Erdoğan has described as a "parallel state" within the security forces seeking to overthrow his government, Turkish authorities have detained two dozen police officers.

14 December 2014: Police conducts raids against opposition media outlets Turkish police have detained at least 23 people in orchestrated raids on opposition media outlets with close ties to the US-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen, a key critic of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The detained, including journalists, producers, scriptwriters, directors, police officers and two former police chiefs, are accused of forming an illegal organisation whose members “engage in forgery and slander”, according to a statement published by the Istanbul public prosecutor’s office.

19 December 2014: Turkey issues arrest warrant against Erdoğan's rival Fethullah Gulen Following the raids on media outlets with ties to Erdogan’s enemy, the U.S. based cleric Fethullah Gülen, Istanbul public prosecutor issued an arrest warrant for the cleric, accusing him of leading a criminal organization.

February 2015: Turkey prepares for the next general elections In the run-up to the next general elections, to be held on June 7th, AKP candidates have entered the competition launching Ottoman-themed campaigns.

"When the AKP came to government at the end of 2002, many envisioned that it would play a leading role in reconciling Islam and democracy by democratizing the Turkish state and its secularism’s implementation (laiklik in Turkish). Twelve years later, there are widespread signs and concerns that the AKP, without diminishing or democratizing the state’s powers in religious affairs, it started to use these powers in order to promote religion in both social life and state affairs." Murat Somer

"Many changes augmented state-religion integration and state-promoted religion in society and politics. The best indicator is the growth of the Diyanet, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, whose staff increased 45% between 2010 and 2013 and the share in the total government budget grew from 0,14% to 1,2%. Moreover, through various new regulations and practices the weight of imam-hatip schools and religious curriculums were increased in education." Murat Somer

Number of students enrolled in Imam-Hatip schools (2002-2014)

"Having accrued sufficient power to make changes in laiklik, the AKP increasingly began to do so mainly by concentrating on only one side of laiklik’s democratic deficits. Without diminishing or democratizing the state’s powers in religious affairs, it started to use these powers in order to promote religion in both social life and state affairs.

There have been some important changes merely improving religious public freedoms without necessarily promoting religion. The single most important one has lifted the Islamic headscarf ban in schools and civil service except for judges, prosecutors, police and the military." Murat Somer

Turkish economy in the post-2011: a turbulent period

"Turkey’s political economy transformed significantly over the last decade. The AKP turned out to be the main actor of this transformation. However, the ‘AKP era’ does not constitute a monolithic period. The first period refers to the ‘golden years’ that broadly covers 2002 to 2007. In this interval the economy performed significantly well in comparison to its own historical standards. This economic vibrancy coincided with an unprecedented wave of democratization reforms partially thanks to the acceleration in the EU candidacy process. The second period refers to the ‘recalibration years’ that broadly covers 2007 to 2011. In this period the Turkish economy encountered the global economic crisis, the most devastating turmoil since the Great Depression of 1929. Accordingly, the economy shrank by 4.7 per cent. Thanks to the resilience of its financial system and robust fiscal discipline, however, Turkey managed to weather the global economic storm. The third phase refers to the ‘turbulent years’ that marks a new threshold opened up after the 2011 elections. On the economic scene Turkey experienced significant problems due to the deceleration of growth rates. The fiscal-financial system that relied on the regulatory state paradigm does not seem enough to underpin high growth rates anymore as the structural problems of the economy began to surface." Mustafa Kutlay

Turkey GDP growth rate

"Turkey is now approaching a new economic turning point in the sense that GDP per capita in current prices has now passed the 10,000-dollar threshold, placing itself among the middle-income economies. In this stage, the economy is moving from a labor-intensive to a capital intensive production, from low and medium technologies to hi-tech exports. Unfortunately, Turkey’s economy is still based on mid-tech manufactured goods, showing that Turkey is far from being a successful country in term of high tech value exports. The low share of high-tech goods over total manufacture Turkey’s exports become more visible if compared to the so-called BRIC countries and even more if compared to the rest of the world." Mustafa Kutlay

High-tech exports over total manufactured exports

"Since economic development constitutes one of the main pillars of Turkish foreign policy proactivism, the sustainability of Turkey’s current economic performance becomes an integral part of its regional power strategies. Turkey needs to develop more inclusive institutions in the economic, technological, educational, legal and R&D realms to overcome the middle-income trap. Turkey’s current institutional performance, however, is not promising in any of the related areas." Mustafa Kutlay

Share of R&D expenditures over GDP

The AKP’s Middle East Policy: Amidst Domestic and Regional Challenges

"Since coming to power the AKP has paid special attention to the Middle East. The region became the most visible example of the implementation of three main pillars of the government’s foreign policy perspective: zero problems with neighbours, expanding economic relations, and mediating conflicts. Especially up until 2009 these policies increased Turkey’s actorness in the region. Turkey failed to achieve its objectives in resolving the conflicts in most of these cases, but through its involvement was able to brand itself as a benign regional power working to introduce stability and order. The situation began to change with the surge of the Arab Spring." Meliha Benli Altunışık

Turkish foreign policy: from "Zero problems with neighbours" to "precious loneliness"

Resetting Turkey-EU Relations?

"Looking at Turkey, the EU has two main concerns. The first relates to domestic developments: the regression of the rule of law, the erosion of democratic institutions and the constraints to the freedom of the press, as well as the reduction in the autonomy of the judiciary. The latter concern relates precisely to regional developments and the fact that Turkey appears increasingly engulfed in the Middle East’s turmoil.

Although Brussels and Ankara have not always converged on regional issues, Turkey remains a key strategic partner for the EU and it would be important for it to regain its constructive and stabilizing role. Beyond the Turkish government’s rhetoric on the EU objective, tangible steps from Ankara would contribute to dispel Brussels’ concerns and reassure on the path the country intends to take.

The EU has to regain credibility in Turkey’s eyes. Concrete signs from the EU towards Ankara could generate positive effects on Turkish policy makers and public opinion, give new credit to the EU and offer new opportunities for cooperation especially in sectors and issues where the two have common interests." Valeria Talbot